![]() If the voter does notice, then the DRE is caught red-handed, except that nothing happens other than the voter tries again (and the DRE doesn’t cheat this time). If the voter doesn’t notice, then the DRE has successfully stolen a vote, and this theft will survive the recount. But think about the “threat model.” Suppose the hacked/cheating DRE changes a vote, and prints the changed vote in the VVPAT. Yes, the voter can alert the pollworker, the ballot will be voided, and the voter can start afresh. It’s not clear to the voter, or to the pollworker, what to do if the VVPAT shows the wrong selections.(For example, in 2016 an instructional video from Buncombe County, NC showed how to use the machine the VVPAT-under-glass was clearly visible at times, but the narrator didn’t even mention that it was there, let alone explain what it’s for and why it’s important for the voter to look at it.) The voter is not well informed about the purpose of the VVPAT.The VVPAT is printed in small type on a narrow cash-register tape under glass, difficult for the voter to read.The problem is, no one has any confidence that the VVPAT is actually “voter verified,” for many reasons: If the DRE had been hacked to cheat, it could report fraudulent vote totals for the candidates, but a recount of the paper VVPAT ballots in the ballot box would detect (and correct) the fraud.īy the year 2009, this idea was already considered obsolete. The voter would select candidates on a touchscreen, the DRE would print those choices on a cash-register tape under glass, the voter would inspect the paper to make sure the machine wasn’t cheating, the printed ballot would drop into a sealed ballot box, and the DRE would count the vote electronically. Those opscan computers can be hacked too, of course, but we can recount or random-sample (“risk-limiting audit”) the paper ballots, by human inspection of the paper that the voter marked, to make sure.įifteen years ago in the early 2000s, we computer scientists proposed another solution: equip the touchscreen DREs with a “voter verified paper audit trail” (VVPAT). The best solution is to vote on hand-marked paper ballots, counted by optical scanners. Touchscreen voting machines (direct-recording electronic, DRE) cannot be trusted to count votes, because (like any voting computer) a hacker may have installed fraudulent software that steals votes from one candidate and gives them to another. States and counties should not adopt DRE+VVPAT voting machines such as the Dominion ImageCast X and the ES&S ExpressVote.
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